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The scope of the term "security" under the federal securities acts'
has in recent years received considerable attention from commenta-
tors. Articles have dealt with the subject in general,' as well as with
such specific arrangements as real estate offerings and condomin-
iums,3 founder/member contracts,4 and franchises. 5 However, to
1. The term "security" is defined in five federal acts: Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15
U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 2(a)(16), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(16)
(1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 2(a)(35), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1970); Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(17), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (1970).
These definitions are virtually identical and any effect of such differences as there are has
been largely eliminated by judicial interpretation. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 344
(1967) (omission of "evidence of indebtedness" in 1934 Act of no'"controlling significance");
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S.
Nov. 13, 1972) (narrow construction of the 1934 Act exclusion of short-term notes).
This Note will speak in terms of the coverage of the 1934 Act, due to the importance of
the antifraud protection in its section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). However, conclusions
about the content of the term "security" may be extended to the other federal securities acts.
The same is largely true as to state securities laws, many of which use definitional language
similar or identical to that of federal legislation. The similarity of statutory language and the
extensive reliance of state and federal courts on each other in the construction of this language
is reflected in the liberal use this Note makes of state court precedents.
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS ARE USED IN THIS NOTE:
S. MAISEL, FINANCING REAL ESTATE (1965) [hereinafter cited as MAISEL];
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?,
18 W. RES. L. REv. 367 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Coffey];
Weil, Land Leasebacks Move Up Fast as Financing Technique, I REAL EST. REV. 65
(Winter, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Weil].
Material filed as part of the record in Huberman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972), is cited as follows:
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed Aug. 9, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Huberman
Complaint];
Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Statement of Reasons
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, filed Aug. 30, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Defen-
dants' Brief];
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Complaint, filed Sept. 13, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief].
2. See Coffey; Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971).
3. See Rifkind & Borton, SEC Registration of Real Estate Interests: An Overview, 27 Bus.
LAW. 649 (1972); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws,
71 COLuM. L. REV. 118 (1971).
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date no consideration has been given to whether the securities laws
apply to an increasingly important method of financing real estate
developments-the sale-leaseback. A recent case, Huberman v.
Denny's Restaurants, Inc.,6 suggests that this issue should be ex-
plored, as to the sale-leaseback in particular and also as to commer-
cial leasing transactions generally. This Note will analyze the sale-
leaseback in terms of the various tests which courts have used in
applying the federal-law concept of "security." 7 It will also deal with
the appropriateness, in policy terms, of including sale-leaseback fi-
nancing as a security.' Finally, the Note will consider whether certain
leasehold transactions other than the pure sale-leaseback are affected
by federal securities legislation?
THE SALE-LEASEBACK
The sale-leaseback is an aptly-named financing method whereby
real property is sold to a purchaser who immediately executes a long-
term lease to the seller/developer. 10 The property covered by the
transaction may or may not include both underlying land and im-
provements, but in any case it has been specifically chosen by the
seller/developer for long-term use in his own business enterprise. The
effect of the sale-leaseback is that the purchaser/lessor supplies long-
4. See Note, Founder Member Contracts Defined as Securities Under Risk-Capital Test,
18 WAYNE L. REV. 1141 (1972).
5. See Comment, The Franchise Agreement: A Security for Purposes of Regulation, 1970
U. ILL. L.F. 130; 24 VAND. L. REV. 638 (1971).
6. 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
7. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970), defines
"security" as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or
other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certifi-
cate of deposit for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a
"security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certifi-
cate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing;
but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
"Investment contract" is the category most frequently used as an open-ended catch-all, and
has been the subject of the bulk of litigation concerning what is meant by "security."
8. See notes 72-101 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 112-45 infra and accompanying text.
10. See MAISEL 386; Fink, Joint Ventures, Limited Partnerships, Sale-Leaseback and
Other Devices: The Developer's Approach (pts. 1-2), 52 CHI. B. REC. 323, 371, at 375 (April-
May, 1971); Weil 66.
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term capital for the development, a fact reflected in rental payments
which typically are set to yield a negotiated rate of interest plus
amortization of some or all of the purchase price over the life of the
lease." As opposed to conventional mortgage financing, the sale-
leaseback offers the developer the advantages of completely deducti-
ble rental expenses (rather than a combination of mortgage payments
that are deductible only to the extent of their interest element, and
depreciation charges that may be low in comparison with the value
of the property)," a high ratio of financing to the value of the prop-
erty,13 certain balance sheet improvements,14 and the opportunity to
realize some of the capitalized value of the enterprise (since the sale
price will often reflect the earning potential of the developed prop-
erty). 15 From the viewpoint of the investor, the sale-leaseback offers
a rate of return slightly higher than is available on mortgages,"6 possi-
bility of high residual value upon expiration of the lease, and perhaps
a degree of upside equity participation through the "percentage
lease" device, whereby the lessor receives "overage" rentals which
increase with the volume of the development's business. 7 While sta-
tus as an owner/lessor may involve tax disadvantages, 18 these are of
11. MAISEL 387. Another reflection of the long-term financing nature of sale-leasebacks is
that prospective purchaser/lessors are quite concerned over the financial rating of their tenants
and (in such cases as shopping centers, where the lessee derives his revenues from sub-leases to
the actual users of the property) sub-tenants. The applicable rate of interest will reflect these
ratings. Id. See R. RICKS, REcENT TRENDS IN INSTITUTIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
26-27 (1964) (insurance companies primarily interested in national-name lessees for sale-
leaseback transactions).
12. See MAISEL 386-87; Weil 70. This explains why sale-leasebacks have been most fre-
quently used with center-city property, where nondepreciable land is likely to be a large percen-
tage of total value, and with property which has a low basis in the hands of the seller due to
rapid depreciation or long ownership.
13. "In typical cases, a company can borrow only two-thirds of the value of a property and
must furnish equity for the remainder. In contrast, on a sale, the lender (purchaser) may pay
up to 100 per cent of the value." MAISEL 386. See also Fink, supra note 10, at 376.
14. Sale of heavily depreciated property will yield a capital gain which, less its tax, is an
addition to capital. Further, a lease appears on a balance sheet only indirectly as a liability
(perhaps as a footnote), while a mortgage is treated as normal debt. See MAISEL 387.
15. See Weil 70-71.
16. The small premium above mortgage rates reflects the increased risk due to the invest-
ment being a larger percentage of the value of the underlying security (the purchased property).
See MAISEL 387. See note 13 supra.
17. See MAISEL 387; R. RICKS, supra note II, at 37-38, 109; Weil 66. One commentator
indicates that in recent years equity participation devices have also become common in mort-
gage financing. Fink, supra note 10, at 375.
18. Tax disadvantages to the lessor are the converse of the lessee's tax advantages-rental
payments must be taken into income in their entirety, not merely to the extent of the interest
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relatively small importance to the insurance companies and tax ex-
empt organizations which frequently are attracted to sale-
leasebacks. 19 In any case, the various advantages to both developers
and investors, combined with a growing concern of developers and
their individual partners for high leverage and tax shelter, have in
recent years made the sale-leaseback a standard real estate financing
technique.20
Huberman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc.2t concerned a variant of
the pure sale-leaseback in that the seller and lessee were not the same
party.22 The property, which was designed for restaurant use, was
purchased from a developer subject to a long-term lease to a restaur-
ant chain. 23 Basically, the developer financed and effected land ac-
quisition and construction of improvements. Upon sale, the devel-
oper's interest was largely liquidated, and the investor, Huberman,
began supplying the long-term capital needed to secure the improved
property for use by the lessee restaurant. In exchange, Huberman was
to receive, under the terms of the lease, a minimum annual "rent"
equal to 10.4 percent of her investment, plus any amounts by which
five percent of the restaurant's gross income exceeded the sum of the
minimum rent and other specified amounts. Of course, she also would
receive the residual value of the property upon expiration of the
lease's term of twenty years (subject to a five-year renewal option).2 4
Huberman brought suit in federal district court seeking to recover
under SEC rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) 21 of the Securities Exchange
element. Further, while depreciation charges should eliminate from current income amounts
received as recapture of capital invested in improvements, and while accelerated depreciation
methods may provide a favorable tax effect in early years, no depreciation charges are available
for the portion of the purchase price allocated to raw land.
19. See MAISEL 387; Weil 66. One commentator argues that insurance companies have not
been sufficiently aware that their effective tax bracket on investment income is quite low due
to the deduction they may take for that portion of such income which is allocated to policy
holders. R. RICKS, supra note 11, at 109. He suggests that as the importance of this fact is
becoming more generally understood, insurance companies are becoming less concerned over
the tax disadvantages of sale-leasebacks and more sensitive to such equity aspects as residual
values and percentage leases. Id. For the details of this aspect of insurance company taxation,
see 8 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 44A.05-06 (1970).
20. See MAISEL 385-86; Weil 65, 71.
21. 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
22. The relevance of this variation is discussed in the text accompanying notes 129-36 infra.
23. 337 F. Supp. at 1250.
24. Id. The opinion is not precisely accurate concerning the terms of the lease. The lease
itself was attached as an exhibit to the Huberman Complaint.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
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Act of 1934. She based her claim on allegedly false and misleading
representations concerning the restaurant's potential for profitability
and growth.27 In fact, the business failed. According to the plaintiff's
allegations, the defendants knew of economic circumstances making
success unlikely, and at the time of the sale had already decided to
terminate the business.2?
The action was brought against the developer, the lessee, the
lessee's corporate parent, and various individual agents and servants
of the corporate defendants. Allegedly, all of the defendants were
under each other's control and all had joined in making the various
representations.29 The lessee defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the transactions in-
volved no "security" as the term is defined in the Securities Exchange
Act. The court denied the motion on the ground that the plaintiff had
purchased an "investment contract."
While Huberman is the first case to consider a sale-leaseback
transaction in terms of the federal securities acts, 0 courts have fre-
quently dealt with the general issue of what constitutes an investment
contract." This case law is based on two Supreme Court decisions,
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.32 and SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 33
In Joiner, an oil land lessee assigned portions of his leasehold, by
particular parcels, in order to finance a test well; if the test well were
to strike oil, the value of oil rights on each parcel would increase
dramatically. The Supreme Court concluded that the parcels were
securities, focusing on the fact that the value of the assignments
27. 337 F. Supp. at 1250.
28. Huberman Complaint 5, para. 24.
29. Id. at 5-6, para. 25.
30. State courts have considered arrangements resembling a sale-leaseback. See Sire Plan
Portfolios, Inc. v. Carpentier, 8 I11. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1956). While in legal form
the seller retained possession of the property under a lease, the arrangement was similar to a
management contract-the rent to be paid to the owners (through a trustee) was to be the net
income from the property less the seller's management fee.
Another case involving a purported leaseback to the seller even more clearly dealt with a
management contract. See Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193
(1932), holding that securities were issued by the seller of certain productive property, namely
rabbits (at four females for $175). Under the agreement the seller would retain possession of
the property, would receive as his management fee one-half of the product (more rabbits), and
would purchase the other half for $1 per unit. The investor was thereby enabled "to share in
the profits of the rabbit meat industry." Id. at 62, 161 A. at 194. Investments were made upon
the promise that, "Your cash multiplies as fast as your rabbits . Id.
31. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 40, 49-53 infra.
32. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
33. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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derived not so much from the naked property rights they represented
as from their character as participations in the test well. This charac-
ter, said the Court, was "the thread on which everybody's beads were
strung."34
The Court's emphasis on economic realities was again evident in
Howey, which dealt with the sale, for investment purposes, of specific
orange trees. While the purchasers could personally care for their
trees if they so chose, in practice most purchasers entered into man-
agement contracts with a corporation related to the seller. Net pro-
ceeds of each harvest were divided by the management company
among the various owners on the basis of the quantity of oranges
picked from their particular trees." In ruling that the arrangement
involved a security, the Court propounded the test that is now the
touchstone for inclusion within the statutory language, "investment
contract":
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in
a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party . . .
As in Joiner, the Court considered irrelevant the fact that the shares
in the common enterprise were evidenced by ownership of specific
assets employed in it?7
Huberman approached the investment contract issue in straight-
forward Howey terms and treated two aspects of the test as meriting
discussion: the presence of a common enterprise and the purchaser's
reliance "solely" on the efforts of others for her profits. The court
found a common enterprise, "as that term is commonly used," in the
fact that both the plaintiff and the lessee "were going to benefit from
the productive operation of the restaurant," one as owner of a suc-
cessful business, the other as a landlord with a tenant whose solvency
would assure her minimum rental and whose success would increase
her rentals s.3 The court also found the reliance element to be satis-
fied:
Plaintiff alleges that she bought a pre-packaged investment contract. She was
not buying a franchise restaurant to manage and defendants have not claimed
that plaintiff ever showed any intention of running the franchise herself. She
34. 320 U.S. at 348.
35. 328 U.S. at 294-96.
36. Id. at 298-99.
37. Id. at 299, 301.
38. 337 F. Supp. at 1251.
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was looking solely to the efforts of . . . [the] defendants for her profits
39
The court also emphasized the extent to which overage rentals would
depend on the efforts of the lessee. The opinion then distinguished
two recent cases" in which franchises were held not to be investment
contracts-in those cases the purchaser/franchisee had managerial
powers and operational responsibilities that were entirely absent from
the Huberman lease agreement.4
The Sale-Leaseback and Prevailing Case Law
The sale-leaseback situation readily satisfies the "profits solely
from the efforts of [others]" element of the Howey test, for quite
clearly the owner/lessoris a passive investor as to the lessee enter-
prise (albeit should that enterprise remove itself from the property,
his profits would then depend on his own efforts).12 However, a com-
mon enterprise is not so clearly present in the sale-leaseback arrange-
ment. This aspect of the test was not explained in Howey and its
vagueness has led several commentators to criticize it as one of the
primary weaknesses of the Howey formulation. 3 Two meanings are
possible-a commonality of enterprise between at least one investor
and a promoter, or a commonality of enterprise among a number of
investors.4 The latter formulation is more consistent with the popular
notion that a security represents one of many similar units of interest
in an enterprise, and seems to be the approach which at least one
court has recently adopted. 5 However, to define a common enterprise
39. Id.
40. Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969); Mr. Steak, Inc.
v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
41. 337 F. Supp. at 1249-51.
42. This part of the Howey test has been liberally interpreted by some courts. See, e.g.,
cases cited in notes 49-53 infra.
43. See Coffey, 374-75; Long, supra note 2, at 143-44; Note, supra note 4, at 1148-49.
44. It has been pointed out that "common enterprise" involves ambiguity not only as to
the number of investors required, but also as to the type of interest in the enterprise that the
investor must have-that is, must it be an equity interest, depending on profitability for its
value, or need it be only the interest of a fixed-sum obligor whose concern is merely that the
enterprise remain solvent? Coffey 374-75 n.41. Since the percentage rental term does provide
a limited equity interest in most sale-leasebacks, see notes 17 supra and 121 infra and accompa-
nying text, this issue need not be confronted at this time. The effect of eliminating this limited
equity interest will be discussed below in the course of considering variations on the typical sale-
leaseback. See notes 113-28 infra and accompanying text.
45. See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S.
Ct. 113 (1972), in which a discretionary commodities trading account was held to involve only
Vol. 1972:1221 ] 1227
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
in this manner would make little sense in terms of results-not only
would it eliminate security status when there is only one investor
rather than two, but it would produce this result as to only one of
the many categories of financial arrangements that are legislatively-
defined to be securities.46 Further, such a restrictive interpretation is
not required for the common enterprise concept to play its most
readily-defensible role: that of distinguishing between those passive
investors who are seeking profits from general market appreciation
or from the independent efforts of unrelated third parties, such as
developers of adjoining real estate, and those seeking profits from the
efforts of persons in some way directly related to the enterprise in
which they have invested. 7
A construction of "common enterprise" that permits its being
found in a sale-leaseback, while not a startling result,48 is nonetheless
more expansive than is required by either the Howey language or its
application in subsequent cases. Such a liberal constructional prefer-
ence is quite consistent not only with the emphasis in Howey and
Joiner on broad construction of remedial statutes, but also with re-
cent judicial application of other elements of the test. Of particular
note is the dilution of the requirement that profits be expected solely
from the efforts of others. While some recent cases literally apply the
word "solely," 49 courts have been increasingly willing to inquire
whether the investor's role in the enterprise is significant in terms of
its ultimate success and whether the investor is sufficiently sophisti-
an agent-principal relationship where there was no pooling of the funds of the various investors
relying on the defendant's trading efforts.
46. See note 7 supra.
47. This view of common enterprise is that adopted by Professor Loss. See 1 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 491 (2d ed. 1961). See also Long, supra note 2, at 162-63, 175.
48. The Attorney General of California has endorsed the view that a common enterprise is
present even where the only persons participating in a common pool are a single investor and
the promoter. See 49 Op. CAL. ArY. GEN. 124, 126-27 (1967) (Op. No. 66-284), reprinted in,
[1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,747, at 66,64142 (1967).
49. Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969) (arguably dictum,
for the "investor" was very heavily involved as a salesman); Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers,
Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So.2d 841 (1968) (founder-member contracts); Georgia Mkt. Centers,
Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969) (founder-member contracts); Goldsmith
v. American Food Serv., Inc., 123 Ga. App. 353, 181 S.E.2d 95 (1971) (franchise); Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (multi-tier distribution
scheme).
50. Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,031 (D. Colo., June 16, 1972);
D.M.C. of Colo., Inc. v. Hays, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,897, at
67,043 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971). See also Davenport v. United States, 260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958)
(employment in a non-managerial capacity insufficient to prevent finding of an investment
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cated that he need not heavily rely on the lessee's representations and
superior knowledge. 5' Thus, a security has been found even though
the purchaser's profits were keyed to his own efforts to attract pros-
pects to inspirational sales meetings52 or to solicit members and other
founder/members for a member-only department store.53 In both of
these situations, much of the investor's return depended on sales
actually being made to his prospects, and the actual selling was con-
trolled by the promoter. In effect, some courts have changed "solely"
to "substantially" in order to assure that the securities laws are re-
sponsive to economic realities and are not undermined by schemes
requiring insignificant investor efforts.54
Similar judicial unwillingness to be closely bound by an overly-
fine applicaton of the Howey language is also reflected in recent
decisions dealing with other aspects of the Howey test.55 While these
cases, and those modifying the "solely" language, are not uniformly
accepted,56 they do indicate a substantial likelihood that many courts
contract); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807 (1965); Bruner v. State, 463
S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (no security found because investor's efforts were more
than "minimal"); 49 OP. CAL. ATry. GEN. 124, 126 (1967) (Op. No. 66-284), reprinted in,
[1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,747, at 66,641 (1967).
51. Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (no
security found where franchisee was an experienced businessman who actively participated in
franchise operations).
52. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972).
53. D.M.C. of Colo., Inc. v. Hays, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
70,897 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., [1954-1971 Transfer
Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,880 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1970), affid, 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d
105 (1971).
Each of these courts also endorsed the view that profits would arise solely from the efforts
of others, within the meaning of Howey, if an investor's profits could easily be eliminated by
the efforts of others (through, for example, failing to open the planned membership department
store). D.M.C. of Colo., Inc. v. Hays, supra at 67,042; State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., supra
at 67,007-08. A similar position was adopted in Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. 71,031 (D. Colo., June 16, 1972).
54. D.M.C. of Colo., Inc. v. Hayes, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
70,897, at 67,042 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., [1954-1971
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,880, at 67,007 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1970), afd, 52
Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
55. See Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967) (reliance need
not be on the efforts of the seller or a party controlled by the seller); Roe v. United States,
287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961) (as in Continental Marketing); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340
F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972) (common enterprise found where investor purchases the obliga-
tion of a third party, but seller guarantees the obligation and is responsible for its collection).
Cf. Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(discretionary commodities trading account held to be an investment contract; no discussion
of Howey).
56. See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S.
Ct. 113 (1972). See also cases cited in note 49 supra.
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would adopt the broader, yet nonetheless natural, construction of the
common enterprise concept that brings sale-leasebacks within the
securities laws.
The Sale-Leaseback and Risk Capital
In addition to the courts which have been applying a loose version
of the Howey test, other courts are making more substantial depar-
tures from Howey by developing a new approach to the "investment
contract." The so-called risk capital test originated in a 1961 decision
of the California Supreme Court, Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski.57 As generally understood, the test involves an inquiry into
whether an investor is supplying a substantial portion of the capital
required for the operation of the enterprise and subject to the risk of
its failure. This approach facilitates greater atteltion to the realities
of the relationships among the parties and the enterprise, especially
since it frees the courts from focusing on the specific wording of the
Howey test. The common enterprise element of Howey is eliminated,
and the court need not look for "profits"; rather, it concerns itself
with whether the investment has been made with an expectation of
receiving some valuable benefit." Of particular importance is the
elimination of the requirement that the investor rely "solely" on the
efforts of others. 9 Instead, the risk capital courts inquire into whether
the investor is an active participant in the enterprise, and whether he
is sufficiently familiar with it to be reasonably independent of the
seller's representations." The result is that securities can readily be
found despite nominal or non-managerial investor involvement
under, for example, some founder/member contracts,"' pyramid
57. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The significance of supplying
risk capital was not entirely new with the Silver Hills decision. The general concept appears in
occasional pre-Howey cases, albeit not in a concise form. See, e.g., Brownie Oil Co. v. Railroad
Comm'r, 207 Wis. 88, 90, 240 N.W. 827, 829 (1932).
58. This means, for example, that a security can be found where an investment is made
not for a monetary return, but rather for a valuable benefit in the form of rights to use club
facilities. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1961). For other interpretative problems involved with the term "profits," see note 125
infra.
59. For a discussion of the interpretative problems posed by this Howey requirement, see
notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
60. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972); Mr. Steak,
Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 646-47 (D. Colo. 1970), affd, 460 F.2d 666
(10th Cir. 1972); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (1971),
affg [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP 1 70,880 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1970).
61. See State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642,485 P.2d 105 (1971), affg [1954-
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schemes,"2 and franchise agreements. 3
The effect of applying the risk capital test to sale-leasebacks is not
entirely clear. While the approach avoids the ambiguities of the com-
mon enterprise requirement, it does raise the issue of whether the
purchaser/lessor's capital is subjected to "risk." Arguably it is not,
inasmuch as it is secured by title to valuable tangible property. In
actual risk capital cases, on the other hand, the likelihood of complete
loss of the investment has been fairly high, with the investor receiving,
for example, rights to use club facilities, if and when built,64 rights to
operate a franchise should the franchisor successfully develop his
product, 5 and rights to commissions should the promoter open a
store and make sales to prospects supplied by a founder-member. 6
It is quite possible that courts will restrict the risk capital test to this
type of high-risk case, despite strong encouragement to the contrary
by some observers.67 Indeed, one court has explicitly adopted the
position that the risk capital test requires "exceptionally high risk"
and not the ordinary "insubstantial risk of doing business."6 Such
an attitude would likely exclude the sale-leaseback investor who, in
any case, would retain improved real property. 9
This is not to say, however, that risk capital courts would consider
sale-leasebacks to be outside the securities acts, for even those courts
1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP 70,880 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1970) (see notes 53-54supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the relaxed Howey test applied by the lower court).
62. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972). The
use in this case of the risk capital test is somewhat unusual. It was treated as a key to whether
an arrangement involved an "instrument commonly known as a 'security,'" whereas other
cases have used the risk capital test as an approach to the "investment contract."
63. See Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,031 (D. Colo., June 16,
1972). Cf. State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., - Ore. App. -....._, 482 P.2d
549 (1971). In this case the court specifically found that investor involvement prevented the
agreement from satisfying the Howey test. Id. at _ 482 P.2d at 552.
64. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1961).
65. See Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,031 (D. Colo., June 16,
1972). State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., - Ore. App. -.... ,482 P.2d 549,
555 (1971).
66. State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971), affg [1954-
1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,880 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1970).
67. Note, supra note 4. See also Coffey 381-96. But see 24 VAND. L. REv. 638 (1971).
68. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970), affd,
460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
69. In addition to the protection created by ownership of the property, Huberman's risk.
was also reduced by rental payments which were guaranteed for the first seven years of the
twenty-year term by the lessee's publicly-traded parent.
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which most narrowly apply the test do not treat it as the exclusive
test for an investment contract. Rather, they use it as a safety valve
to provide securities legislation protection to high-risk investors who
are not protected under Howey.7° Whether the risk capital courts
would hold sale-leasebacks to be within Howey is a different issue.
However, since they obviously are unwilling to be bound by restric-
tive application of the conventional test, it seems likely that they
would accept the construction of "common enterprise" which quali-
fies the sale-leaseback as a security under Howey.1
The Sale-Leaseback and Securities Regulation Policy
The foregoing discussion indicates that many courts will, if con-
fronted with the issue, find that sale-leasebacks are subject to federal
securities legislation. It remains to be considered whether such a
result conforms with the policies underlying that legislation. Several
approaches to this issue will be developed. First, the appropriateness
of including sale-leasebacks as securities will be considered by means
of an analogy to a similar financial transaction which clearly involves
a security.7 2 Second, the issue will be considered in terms of a test
which one commentator has proposed as the key to defining not only
investment contracts but all other forms of securities as well;73 this
test has the advantage of directly focusing on the particular elements
of a financial transaction which are thought to justify special protec-
70. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 646 (D. Colo. 1970), affd,
460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., - Ore.
App. -, 482 P.2d 549 (1971). Should any court treat the risk capital approach as its exclusive
investment contract test, consistency with Howey would seem to require a relaxed concept of
risk that would reach a sale-leaseback. This approach would be required because the sale-
leaseback involves the same risk as was present in Howey, namely, that of purchasing invest-
ment property at a price which is based on the seller's claims as to its profitability under his
own, or a third party's, management and control.
71. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the construction of
"common enterprise" that is needed to qualify the typical sale-leaseback as a Howey security,
72. See notes 76-81 infra and accompanying text. That the other categories of the statutory
definition may be considered in determining the scope of the "investment contract" language
is supported not only by the argument that the securities laws are aimed at a general evil, not
merely specific and arbitrary manifestations of the evil, but also by the Supreme Court's use
of this method in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967):
Contracts such as the [one at bar] offer important competition to mutual funds. . . and
are pitched to the same consumer interest in growth through professionally managed
investment. It seems eminently fair that a purchaser of such a plan be afforded the same




tion against fraud.74 Third, the issue will be approached in terms of
the Supreme Court's broad-brush concept of the role and purpose of
the federal securities laws.75
Analogy to Other Securities. The legislative definition of "secu-
rity" enumerates a number of particular instruments and encompas-
ses those commonly used to finance business activity. The listing
includes not only equity instruments but also fixed-obligation instru-
ments, both secured and unsecured, such as "any note, . . . bond,
[or] debenture . . . .-17 The fact that a mortgage is covered, as a
"note" or "evidence of indebtedness" 77 is especially relevant, for in
terms of risk and economic function a mortgage is quite similar to a
sale-leaseback.78 The essential characteristic of a commercial mort-
gage is that it parlays the resale value of specific property into financ-
ing for the use of that property, and in this respect the sale-leaseback
is similar. The two are also similar from the standpoint of the mort-
gagee or lessor should the promoter default on his obligations: each
is left with the specific property in lieu of the regular, long-term, fixed
income for which he made his investment; in addition, in each case
the improvements are likely to be specialized in nature and of reduced
value when used other than in the business for which they were de-
signed and in which the promoter has failed. Finally, mortgages and
sale-leasebacks are viewed by developers and investors as related
financing methods carrying similar interest rates,79 and in many in-
stances the choice of one or the other turns on tax advantages to the
developer/lessee rather than on differences of any significance as to
whether a security is involved."0
74. See notes 82-92 infra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 93-101 infra and accompanying text.
76. See note 7 supra.
77. Rifkind & Borton, supra note 3, at 660. Limited exemptions from the securities acts
for mortgage transactions are found in SEC rule 15a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-! (1972), and
SEC rule 234, id. § 230.234 (1972).
78. This similarity can be so pronounced that the "seller/lessee" may be deemed, for
purposes of deducting his rental payments, not to have sold the property at all, such that the
transaction constituted merely the extension of a mortgage loan. In such a case, the
"seller/lessee" may deduct only the interest portion of the "rental" payments. The leading case
on this subject involved a lease term of ten years (with 15 years of renewal options), rent equal
to 5 percent interest plus amortization of the purchase price over the initial term, and a
repurchase option at a very low price. See Paul W. Frenzel, 32 P-H TAX Cr. MEM.
1 63,276 (1963).
79. MAISEL 386-87; Fink, supra note 10, at 375-76. In the case of sale-leasebacks the
applicable interest rate is of course translated into dollar-value "rental" payments. See note
I I supra and accompanying text. See also Weil 66, 70.
80. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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Of course, sale-leasebacks do differ from mortgages in ways that
are relevant to whether a security is involved. A sale-leaseback gives
the investor a long-run residual interest; it is more likely to provide
him with participation in the lessee's success, through percentage
rental clauses; and it may be junior to mortgage financing if the
property was purchased subject to a mortgage."1 These differences,
however, do not remove sale-leasebacks from the class of financing
methods that are defined as securities; rather they render the sale-
leaseback even more appropriate for security status and its antifraud
protection. Each of these differences makes the transaction more
akin to equity financing but none increases the investor's participa-
tion in or control over the operations of the enterprise. While in form
a sale of real property, the sale-leaseback is, as a matter of economic
and financial reality, mortgage financing with modifications which
give it, in a limited way, the risks and potential earnings of an equity
interest. So characterized, the sale-leaseback is appropriately in-
cluded in that statutorily-described class of financial transactions
which encompasses mortgages, common stock, and such limited-
equity instruments as convertible debentures and preferred stock.
The Coffey Approach. Professor Coffey advocates a policy-
oriented test of whether a particular transaction should be considered
a security. He argues that the "security" concept should reach trans-
actions involving a substantial possibility of fraud; it is the danger of
fraud which, for Coffey, justifies the special antifraud causes of ac-
tion, procedures, and remedies provided by federal securities legisla-
tion. 82 Thus, he seeks to identify characteristics of financial transac-
tions which make fraud likely. The result is an elaborate version of
the risk capital test, but its concept of risk is much less restrictive
than that generally employed by risk capital courts. For Coffey, a
security is (1) a transaction (which term encompasses the collective
effect of multiple related events, such as a sale followed by a separate
leaseback)3 in which (2) an investor contributes to an enterprise
something of value which (3) is subjected to a risk of loss,84 where (4)
81. Weil 66. See also Fink, supra note 10, at 376.
82. Coffey 371-73. Since all securities are subject to antifraud provisions, but only certain
classes of publicly-issued securities are subject to the registration requirements of the securities
acts, it is proper to focus on the need for antifraud protection in defining a security. For a
discussion of the ways in which the securities statutes relax the procedural and substantive
requirements for common-law and equitable fraud actions, see 3 L. Loss, supra note 47, at
1421-44, 1763-97.
83. Coffey 377-80.
84. Id. at 377, 380-96.
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the investor has little familiarity with or control over the enterprise,8 5
and where (5) he has a reasonable expectation of receiving some form
of valuable benefit in excess of his original contribution. 6
Since the sale-leaseback investor typically does not participate in
the enterprise, and since he clearly invests with an expectation of net
benefit, the key to applying Coffey's test to a sale-leaseback lies in
the meaning of "risk." As already mentioned, Coffey's concept of
risk is much broader than that used by some courts,87 as indeed it
.must be if the test is to serve as a single standard for identifying all
forms of securities. For Coffey, any significant risk to the initial
investment is sufficient to invoke the antifraud protection of the se-
curities laws if the transaction otherwise qualifies.8 He includes not
only the risks attendant to equity interests, but also the unsecured
creditor's risk that equity and junior indebtedness will be eroded, as
well as the secured creditor's risk that unsuccessful operation of the
enterprise will "take its toll of the property securing the debt." 9 In
addition, he specifically asserts that a buyer incurs sufficiently signifi-
cant risk when he purchases property which is immediately recom-
mitted to an enterprise." While the last category appears to encom-
pass the sale-leaseback, Coffey does not specifically mention this
financing method; in his examples, the investor's return is both varia-
ble and highly dependent upon the success of the enterprise in em-
ploying the property-such as contracts for management, servicing,
or resale by the enterprise. 1 Thus, it is arguable that sale-leasebacks
are excluded because of their fixed-return elements. However, one
must be aware that Coffey's basic inquiry is not whether a transaction
fits one of his specific categories, but rather is whether the investor's
contribution is subject to any actual risk of loss. Clearly, the sale-
85. Id. at 377, 396-98.
86. Id. at 377, 398-403. The principal ways in which this test differs from Howey are its
concentration on risk of loss of the original investment, its de-emphasis of the importance of
.profits," its clarification of "profits" as "valuable benefits," and its elimination of the com-
mon enterprise requirement.
87. See notes 64-68 supra and accompanying text.
88. Coffey 384-85.
89. Id. at 385-86. A debt that is secured by real property is nonetheless subject to significant
risks at the hands of a failing enterprise. In particular, repairs and maintenance are likely to
have been ignored or given short shrift, and it is possible that the secured debtor would take
the property subject to liens for unpaid taxes and utilities. In addition, account must be taken
of the expense and delay required to obtain a purchaser or tenant for the property.
90. Id. at 386-90.
91. Id. at 386 nn. 89-90, 401 n.147.
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lease-back carries at least the risk inherent in secured debt,9" espe-
cially since it often involves specialized property, the value of which
depends on profitable employment by the enterprise. In sum, it seems
reasonably clear that a sale-leaseback qualifies under Coffey's test as
a transaction which should be accorded the special protections of the
securities acts.
Supreme Court Interpretation of Securities Legislation Policy. A
final approach to the question of whether sale-leasebacks belong in
the category of "investment contracts" involves a consideration of
the policies which the Supreme Court finds embodied in federal se-
curities legislation. Howey and other Supreme Court "investment
contract" cases93 contain at least two policy themes of particular
importance to the sale-leaseback question: that the statutory policy
is one of "affording broad protection to investors,"94 and that this
primary policy is to be implemented with regard to a transaction's
economic substance, not to the legal form in which it is cast.
Although the statutory purpose is said to be protection of particu-
lar people known as "investors," the statutory protections are trig-
gered by the presence of something other than an investor, namely a
"security." This leads to the question whether an "investor" is pro-
tected because he buys a statutorily defined "security," or whether a
"security" is something that is subject to the statutes because it is
purchased by persons who are, within the contemplation of the stat-
utes, "investors." Clearly, the typical judicial approach is the former,
under which the inquiry is whether a transaction involves one of the
specified instruments. However, in determining the nature of the in-
strument known as an "investment contract," the Supreme Court in
Howey considered whether the purchaser was a statutorily-protected
"investor" and also indicated the characteristics of such a person.
The Court stated that the term "security" embodies a "flexible rather
than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of
the money of others on the promise of profits."5 The Court added:
Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present here. The
92. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
94. 328 U.S. at 301.
95. Id. at 299 (emphasis added). This language was repeated in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
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investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promot-
ers manage, control and operate the enterprise. It follows that the arrange-
ments whereby the investors' interests are made manifest involve investment
contracts . . .
In short, Howey tells us that the definition of "security" will be
expanded to protect those who, upon the expectation of profit, pro-
vide capital financing for profit-seeking enterprises belonging to oth-
ers.97
The Supreme Court has also made it clear that in determining the
'breadth of securities act protection, the inquiry is to be focused on
economic reality rather than legal form. In Howey the Court found
a security even though the documents consisted of land sale contracts,
warranty deeds and service contracts, while in Joiner documentation
in the form of oil lease assignments did not remove the scheme from
securities law coverage. Emphasizing the importance of the substance
of a transaction, the Howey Court stated that the "arrangements...
involve investment contracts, regardless of the legal terminology in
which such contracts are clothed. '9 8 Similar statements may be found
in all Supreme Court investment contract cases.99
To summarize this discussion of the policy basis of the Howey
test, the broad protection of the securities laws is not restricted to a
closed set of transactions specified by either legislation or judicial
decision. Rather, the protection extends to any transaction, whatever
its name and secondary traits, in which the lure of profit is used to
obtain financing. When these characteristics are coupled with the fact
that "it is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or non-
speculative,"'00 it becomes apparent that even if a sale-leaseback does
96. 328 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
97. This statement is of course subject to such statutorily-specified exceptions as that for
obligations issued or guaranteed by a state. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(12), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
98. 328 U.S. at 300. Further, the Court noted: "Form was disregarded for substance and
emphasis was placed on economic reality." Id. at 298 (commenting favorably on state-law
cases).
99. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) ("Finally, we are reminded that,
in searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality." Id. at 336); SEC
v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (The test is not the nature (realty or
personalty) of the assets supporting a particular document. "The test rather is what character
the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution and the
economic inducements held out to the prospect." Id. at 211, quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943)).
100. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 345 (1967), quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
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not fit neatly within the wording of the Howey test, it must be in-
cluded as an investment contract. Otherwise, the Supreme Court's
underlying concept of the purpose and reach of securities legislation
will not be given effect; as has been discussed above,' in economic
reality the sale-leaseback is a transaction in which the seller/lessee
obtains long-term financing from an investor who receives promises
or representations of security and profit.
The Effect of Securities Regulation on Sale-Leasebacks
This Note has concluded that courts in the future are likely to
treat sale-leasebacks as securities. However, such treatment is un-
likely to have a burdensome, or even noticeable, effect on developers
who deal solely with institutional investors. First, sale-leasebacks
with such investors qualify for the private placement exemption from
registration.' Second, an institutional investor's standard investiga-
tory procedures will normally elicit and verify the information needed
for a responsible investment decision.0 3 Thus, even if the lessee
should default, the circumstances are not likely to support a claim
of fraud. Finally, such investors are normally well-protected by exten-
sive, carefully drafted contractual provisions.0 4
101. For a discussion of the nature of the sale-leaseback as a financing technique, see notes
10-20, 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
102. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). While one hesitates to
categorically state that any such transaction qualifies for the private offering exemption, see
note 107 infra and accompanying text, the exemption has little meaning if it does not reach
sales to institutional investors. See The Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,523, at 94,970-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
103. The institutional investor's ability to obtain necessary information was recognized in
The Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Se. L.
REP. 9 91,523, at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1965):
The [mutual] funds. . . were sophisticated, knowledgeable, experienced institutional
investors with great resources, and plainly were "able to fend for themselves." All of
them . . . clearly would have had access to the kind of information which a registration
statement would have disclosed, as well as the ability and opportunity to investigate [the
issuer], interrogate [the seller], and analyze the securities ...
[Tihe offerees possessed enough sophistication to demand, and enough leverage at
the bargaining table to receive, all information relevant to make a fully informed deci-
sion on whether or not to buy [the] stock.
104. The low likelihood of fraud being practiced in isolated transactions with sophisticated
investors has led Professor Coffey to argue that such transactions should be entirely exempt
from the securities laws and not merely from registration. Coffey 407-1I. He acknowledges that
the statutes and cases provide little support for this position, but urges that considerations of
administrative and judicial economy call for cutting off application of the statutes short of
thousands of transactions in which there is little need for the statutory protections. Id. This
argument fails to recognize that no administrative or judicial burden is created unless an
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As to individual investors, on the other hand, there is a somewhat
greater basis for the fears expressed by counsel for the Huberman
defendants that a decision adverse to them would "upset innumerable
existing leases, [and] also swamp the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission."'10 5 In the first place, the individual investor's frequent lack
of sophistication and investigatory resources creates a situation in
which deception can readily occur, so that 10b-5 actions involving
sale-leasebacks can be expected in the future. In addition, a more
.serious threat to sale-leaseback financing schemes may be available
to individual investors: a suit for rescission under section 12 of the
1933 Act,' grounded on the developer's having made a public offer-
ing of an unregistered security. Whether the private offering exemp-
tion from registration is available in sale-leasebacks with individuals
is uncertain, even when only one investor buys the entire offering.
Some recent cases have indicated that the exemption is available only
when the offerees have a high degree of access to information about
the enterprise.0 " Thus, eligibility for private placement exemptions
could be particularly troublesome when, as in Huberman, sale-
leasebacks are sold through real estate agents. Not only might real-
tors make a large number of offers, but their offerees are likely to
have neither sophistication nor significant access to corporate infor-
mation.
Although the facts in Huberman make it apparent that some
individuals purchase sale-leasebacks, most developers probably deal
with institutions. Real estate literature treats the sale-leaseback as the
exclusive domain of institutional investors, giving no indication what-
soever that sale-leasebacks, or participations in them, are considered
appropriate for sale to individuals.' This omission is not surprising
investor seeks relief from alleged fraud, and that the protection is in fact needed in those
isolated cases of fraud on sophisticated investors.
105. Defendants' Brief at 6.
106. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). A rescission suit is more serious
than a I Ob-5 action for two reasons. First, the recovery, in terms of dollars, is greater, for the
rescinding purchaser gets his purchase price plus interest, whereas the successful IOb-5 plaintiff
retains the security and gets only the difference between its fair market value and the purchase
price. Second, the burden of proof of fraud and damage in a 10b-5 action is on the plaintiff.
Rescission, on the other hand, is granted virtually automatically upon the issuer's failure to
carry the burden of proving his eligibility for an exemption from registration. See, e.g., Hender-
son v. Hayden-Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1972). Cf. A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur
D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43 n.2 (1941).
107. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.C., 463 F.2d 137, 159 (5th Cir. 1972); Hender-
son v. Hayden-Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1972).
108. See generally MAISEL 386-87; R. RICKS, supra note 11; Fink, supra note 10; Weil.
Vol. 1972:1221 ] 1239
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
since only institutional investors are not significantly affected by the
periodic return being treated as rent and thus entirely includible in
taxable income." 9 Further, the sale-leaseback does not provide the
flow-through of enterprise tax losses that has in recent years made
limited partnerships popular with individual investors. Such tax con-
siderations suggest that individuals are more likely to invest in real
estate developments as limited partners of the developer/lessee than
as purchaser/lessors." 0
To summarize, even if courts uniformly hold sale-leasebacks to
be securities, the securities laws will continue to have a very limited
impact in transactions involving the primary sale-leaseback pur-
chaser-the institutional investor. However, security status could be
quite significant to the extent sale-leasebacks involve individual inves-
tors, especially when the requirements of the private offering exemp-
tion are not met."'
VARIATIONS ON THE SALE-LEASEBACK
The foregoing discussion has focused on the typical commercial
sale-leaseback-that is, a purchase accompanied by execution of a
net,"2 percentage, long-term lease to the seller or to a party related
to him. This Note will now inquire into the effects of varying the
transaction in certain respects. Consideration will be given to sale-
leasebacks without a percentage rent provision, to transactions in
which the lease is with a party unrelated to the seller, and to transac-
tions involving a lease and nothing more.
Fixed-Rental Sale-Leasebacks
If the Huberman lease had provided for a flat rental, with the
lessor receiving no overage for increased lessee sales, the case might
have had a different resolution. As mentioned above," 3 the court
109. See MAISEL 386-87. For a discussion of the tax effects of sale-leasebacks, see notes
12, 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
110. See Weil 71.
11l. Throughout this discussion it has been assumed that sale-leaseback investors will not
be troubled by the SEC rule 144 restrictions on resale of unregistered securities, The rule is
broadly worded and in fact will mean that the concerned investor cannot obtain an SEC no-
action letter assuring that he is considered exempt from the prohibitions against sale of unregis-
tered securities contained in section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. However, this is not a
problem for investors whose activities are so unlike those of underwriters or dealers that they
are confident of qualifying for the exemption of section 4(1).
112. The meaning of the term "net lease" is discussed in note 142 infra.
113. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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used the percentage rental term in finding that the restaurant was a
common enterprise and in finding that the plaintiff was looking to
the defendants' efforts for her profits. In neither respect is it clear that
the overage was critical to the conclusion, but it is obvious that the
court's decision was made easier by the presence of some participa-
tion in success." 4 This reliance on the percentage provision is some-
what surprising in light of the term's apparently minor role in nego-
tiation of the sale: plaintiff was approached on the basis of an invest-
.ment with annual return of 10.4 percent; the total amount of the
investment, and thus the specific amount of rental payments would
depend on as-yet-undetermined construction costs.115 Neither the
pleadings nor the descriptive literature.supplied by the seller's real-
tor t 6 indicate that the overage was of importance to the desirability
of the investment. The court's interest in the percentage provision
apparently arose from the position taken in the defendants' brief that
the central issue was whether a percentage lease was a security.117 In
contrast, the plaintiff's formulation of the issue was whether the "in-
vestment package,"118 consisting of property subject to a leasehold in
a party that had promoted the transaction, was a security. As viewed
by the plaintiff, the percentage provision was an incidental term, not
the controlling characteristic."' For reasons to be discussed, the
plaintiff's view is the correct one, the defendants failed to confront
the central issue, and the court derived too much comfort from the
presence of a percentage rental term.
To treat sale-leasebacks as securities only when they contain a
percentage rental term would be inconsistent with economic reality.
The primary inducement to invest in the typical sale-leaseback is a
healthy annual return from financially sound tenants or sub-
tenants 20 Equity participation, along with residual values, and, in
some cases, depreciation flows are secondary considerations. The
114. The court refers to the overage rentals at several points. However, it never does so in
a manner that indicates their precise importance to its decision. See 337 F. Supp. at 1251.
115. "Agreement of Sale and Deposit Receipt," Term and Condition of Sale Number 16,
attached as Exhibit B to Affidavit of Robert M. Tuller, filed in support of Plaintiffs Brief.
116. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Robert M. Tuller, filed in support of Plaintiffs Brief.
117. See Defendants' Brief at 4, 6-7.
118. The characterization as an "investment package" is, of course, highly suggestive that
the transaction was akin to a security, and was used frequently in the plaintiffs brief. It is
noteworthy, however, that the, term was also used in the affidavit of the realtor who sold the
property to Huberman. See Affidavit of Robert M. Tuller, accompanying Plaintiffs Brief.
119. Plaintiffs Brief at 4, 8-10.
120. See notes II, 16-20 supra and accompanying text.
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percentage term is viewed primarily as a hedge against inflation and
is a fringe attraction that has become popular only in recent years."'
Such a minor and easily-foregone characteristic should not be the
determinant of federal antifraud protection.
In addition, placing such emphasis on the percentage term would
do violence to the general thrust of the federal concept of a security.
As has been noted, 22 the securities acts do not restrict themselves to
equity securities; rather, they explicitly encompass such fixed-
obligation instruments as notes, bonds and debentures. While it is
true that most arrangements heretofore deemed "investment con-
tracts" have been equity participation schemes, 23 this is not conclu-
sive that all must be so classified. Indeed, one recent case has found
a fixed-obligation instrument to be an investment contract.2 4 Fur-
ther, it can be argued that the Howey language does reach fixed-
obligation financing methods: "profits" can readily mean nothing
more than a return in excess of the original investment,2 1 a form of
121. Compare Weil 66, 68 (1971) (indicating that percentage terms are typical and are used
primarily as hedges against inflation) with MAISEL 387 (no indication that percentage terms
were used) and R. RIcKS, supra note I1, at 37-38, 109 (1964) (occasional, but apparently not
typical, use by insurance company purchaser/lessors, with the suggestion that growing empha-
sis on the equity aspects of real estate investment would lead to increasingly frequent use).
122. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
123. Only one investment contract case dealing with a fixed-obligation arrangement has
been found. See SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972). The reason
that such cases have so rarely arisen seems plain enough-fixed-obligation financing instru-
ments will typically fit within the specific statutory language, "any note, . . . bond, debenture
.. " As has been mentioned, this is true of the sale-leaseback's next-of-kin, the mortgage.
124. SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972) (sale of third-party
contractual obligations, where seller guarantees the obligation and acts as collection agent for
the purchaser).
In addition, the SEC has recently refused to issue a no-action letter for a scheme in which
the issuer's obligation was to be fixed. See Investment Diamonds, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,350 (SEC 1971). The issuer proposed to sell diamonds
at retail prices subject to a repurchase agreement under which the investor was guaranteed
"profits" of 5 percent per year. The investor at all times would have the option to sell his
diamond to a third party, so that the investor could obtain the benefit of general market
appreciation. However, as noted in the issuer's inquiry letter, "There is not a market for resale
available at which an individual can dispose of a diamond he has purchased at retail and expect
to realize the true value." Id. 78,350, at 80,907. Thus, in practice the investor would have to
rely on the issuer's repurchase agreement for his profits.
125. This construction is consistent with the following language in State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920):
[An investment contract is a contract or scheme for] the placing of capital or laying out
of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment. (Emphasis
added).
This language is quoted in Howey. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). Gopher
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"common enterprise" is present when an entrepreneur and his fixed-
sum obligee are both looking to the same enterprise for their expected
returns," and the fixed-sum obligee is clearly depending on efforts
of another when his return depends on the entrepreneur's being suffi-
ciently successful to meet the fixed obligations. Moreover, under
Coffey's general test for a security'2 the percentage term would make
no difference whatsoever; whether it is present or not, the same risk
to the initial investment remains-a defaulting tenant would leave the
purchaser holding property whose value would depend primarily
upon successful employment in a particular enterprise which had
failed. Finally, it should be noted that the presence or absence of a
percentage term does not affect the fact that a sale-leaseback is a
form of financing whereby the capital of passive investors is made
available to a promoter in his profit-seeking activities.' In summary,
the various considerations and tests relevant to defining a security
either lead to or are not inconsistent with the conclusion that a sale-
leaseback is within the definition, whether or not the lease provides
for rentals that escalate with the lessee's revenues.
Purchase from a Party Unrelated to the Lessee
Since the seller and the lessee were different parties, the transac-
tion in Huberman was not a pure sale-leaseback. However, the plain-
tiff alleged that fraudulent representations were made "by each of the
defendants, and [that] each of the defendants [was] under the control
and direction of each of the remaining defendants."'' 2  The transac-
tion could thus be considered as one in which the seller was suffi-
ciently related to the lessee as to be a pre-arranged conduit for an
Tire was apparently the first case to deal with the "investment contract" issue and was acknowl-
edged by the Supreme Court as a source of its Howey test. Id.
That "profits" should mean no more than return, either fixed or variable, in excess of initial
investment has the support of commentators. See Coffey 403; Long, supra note 2, at 144, 175-
76. However, some case law is more restrictive, requiring that the investor share in profits of
the enterprise. See Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 94 Ohio L. Abs. 357, 366, 199 N.E.2d 120,
124 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964); Commonwealth ex reL Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research
Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 255-56, 199 A.2d 428, 429 (1964).
126. This assertion involves the issue raised in note 44 supra and is a result of the ambiguity
of "common enterprise."
127. See notes 82-92 supra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text for the proposition that the Supreme
Court understands protection in these circumstances to be the securities legislation policy that.
underlies its Howey test.
129. Huberman Complaint 5-6, para. 25.
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investment in the lessee's enterprise. 13
A more difficult question would arise if the seller and the lessee
were completely independent, such that the project was sold subject
to the lease but without the assistance of the lessee. In the latter
situation, clearly no investment is made in the seller's enterprise, for
neither seller nor buyer have, by virtue of the sale, any continuing
claims on or relations with each other. Further, it is difficult to
conceive of the transaction as an investment in the lessee's enterprise,
since no cash goes to the lessee. These considerations may prevent
the transaction from satisfying either the Howey test (requiring in-
vestment in a common enterprise), or the risk capital test (requiring
that the investor supply risk capital to an enterprise controlled by
another), and may also prevent the transaction from qualifying under
the general policy of protecting those who supply capital, upon the
promise of profit, -for the use of others. (On the face of the transac-
tion, the investor supplies nothing more than sale proceeds to the
seller and rental services to the lessee.) 131 In any case, even if the
various investment contract tests are not satisfied, the sale by a party
unrelated to the lessee can still involve a security. The investment
contract tests focus on whether a security is issued to an initial inves-
tor, whereas when the sale is by a party unrelated to the lessee, the
question is whether the transaction involves a security that has pre-
viously been issued. 13 The antifraud protection of the securities acts
130. Whether the developer and lessee so viewed the transaction, such that actual construc-
tion of the restaurant depended on obtaining a buyer, is difficult to determine. On the face of
the lease, the developer was bound to supply the improved property in any case. See Lease dated
March 3, 1969, accompanying the Huberman Complaint. However, construction did not
commence until approximately the time Huberman agreed to the deal, several months later
than originally scheduled. Affidavit of Robert M. Tuller, at 3 and Exhibit A thereto, accompa-
nying Plaintiff's Brief.
131. The basis on which these objections might be met is that in economic reality the
purchaser does supply capital to the enterprise, inasmuch as the property which he now owns
but which is used by the enterprise not only is a capital asset in his own hands but also frees
the enterprise of reliance on alternative sources of financing exactly to the extent of a cash
investment equal to the property's market value.
132. The assumption that sale-leaseback property retains its security status in subsequent
transfers appears sound in light of the treatment of other securities; for example, common stock
is a security regardless of who sells it. However, a distinction could be drawn on grounds that
the common stock is a security by virtue of specific inclusion in the statute, whereas the sale-
leaseback is included by virtue of a judicial test which concentrates on the characteristics of
the particular transaction. (For the argument that sale, even by a lessor who is unrelated to
the lessee, does itself satisfy the transactional investment contract test, see note 131 supra.) A
number of replies may be made to this distinction. First, since the investment contract cases
have all involved the initial issuance of a security, it is natural that the tests they use should be
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reaches beyond initial investors to subsequent purchasers of a secu-
rity. If a security was created in the earlier transaction whereby the
seller agreed to supply real property to the lessee in exchange for
rental payments, then the purchaser is accorded the protection of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 13 against fraud practiced not only by
the seller but also by the lessee.134 A subsequent investor in sale-
leaseback property is therefore accorded securities act protection
even if the lessee does not participate in the subsequent transaction,
since the initial sale of the property subject to the lease created a
security. 13
However, the result is not as clear if the seller, without direction
from a prospective lessee, acquired property, improved it, and solic-
ited a tenant or tenants. At this point the issue becomes whether or
not an ordinary commercial lease is a security. Although this ques-
cast in terms of the original transaction; certainly, such cases are not conclusive of the rights
of subsequent purchasers. Second, the statutory term "investment contract" suggests docu-
ments with an existence and security status independent of the process by which they are created
(if documents in the case of the sale-leaseback are required, they would be the deed and the
lease to which the deeded property is subject). Third, the subsequent purchaser of an investment
contract has no less need than subsequent purchasers of other securities for protection against
deviations by the issuer from his original representations and commitments, and for protection
against misrepresentations by the seller-whether one is dealing with an investment contract
or other securities, the subsequent purchaser values the security on the basis of these various
representations and commitments. Fourth, whether the original transaction involves issuance
of an investment contract or some other security, the price which the issuer can obtain depends
heavily on the initial investor's opinion of the security's resale value; that is, whatever type of
security may be involved, if its security status is not retained, the initial investor faces the
danger of being locked into an investment which is more valuable to him than to potential
buyers, and this reduced liquidity would depress the price he is willing to pay for the security.
133. It should be noted that these apply to "the purchase or sale" of securities, and are
not directed merely at fraud practiced in the issuance of a security. SEC rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1972).
134. Unlike common law fraud, rule lOb-5 does not require contractual privity between the
defrauding and injured parties, at least where the plaintiffs injury arises from fraudulent
issuance to the party from whom he purchases the security. See Texas Continental Life Ins.
Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 25 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'don other grounds, 307
F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962). The circuit court specifically approved the lower court's holding on
the privity issue, stating: "It was not necessary that there be privity between plaintiff and the
defendants in the sale of the bonds." 307 F.2d at 249.
More frequently, the privity issue has arisen in the situation where the plaintiff purchases
from a third party at an inflated price due to the defendant's false representations to a fourth
unrelated party. Courts have split on this issue. Compare Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio &
Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.
1952) (insufficient privity) with Gann v. Bernzomatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
and Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 926-28 (2d ed. 1968).
135. See notes 42-101 supra and accompanying text.
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tion may seem startling, it must be considered because the principles
supporting the argument that a sale-leaseback is a security also sug-
gest that all commercial leases are securities."' This Note will con-
clude with a fuller explanation of the foregoing assertion, and with
an attempt to draw a rational, meaningful line somewhere between a
sale-leaseback and the ordinary commercial lease. The resolution
that will be suggested is not completely satisfactory, but it is believed
to be sufficiently non-arbitrary to avert the conclusion that since
including a sale-leaseback as a security forces one to include too
much, the sale-leaseback itself should be excluded.
The Ordinary Commercial Lease
The ordinary lease seems to be nothing more than a sale of serv-
ices to the lessee, and the term "security" may have little meaning if
it is so broad and unrestricted that every commercial lessee issues a
security to his lessor. However, approaching this problem through a
liberal Howey test, one could conclude that the ordinary lease is
indeed a security, for the purchaser is expecting income from the
efforts of another party (albeit not the seller),'37 and he is investing
in a common enterprise in that the income from his investment, like
that of the sale-leaseback lessor, depends upon the success of the
lessee's business.'38 On the other hand, it can be argued that execu-
tion of a lease involves neither a sale nor an investment and is thus
not within the reach of securities legislation or cases. However, the
point is not compelling, for a lease is little different in this respect
from a secured bond-capital is provided to an enterprise which
promises periodic payments for so long as it retains the capital. The
principal difference is that bonds are issued to those who supply
capital in the form of cash, while leases are issued to those who supply
it in kind.
Aside from being troubling, the inability to exclude ordinary
leases from the definition of a security emphasizes a basic weakness
136. Non-commercial leases cannot qualify for security status under any circumstances, for
in such cases the lessor will never be providing financing for another person's profit-making
enterprise. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
137. The Howey language, quoted at note 36 supra, does not require that the purchaser
rely solely on the efforts of the seller; rather, it refers to profits expected "solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party" (emphasis added). Subsequent decisions have held that the
third party need not be related to the seller. See cases cited in note 55 supra.
138. See text accompanying note 38 supra for the Huberman court's handling of the com-
mon enterprise element in sale-leaseback financing. For a discussion of fixed-rental sale-lease-
backs, see notes 113-28 supra and accompanying text.
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of substituting the Howey formula for direct consideration of under-
lying policy objectives-literally applied it is too inflexible to encom-
pass all situations which should be reached, 39 and liberally applied
it is too free of policy restraints to stop short of situations that are
inappropriate for inclusion. A better approach is to inquire whether
in economic substance the transaction is, rather than a sale of rental
services, one in which the lessor, upon expectation of profit, makes
his capital available for use by another.4 0 However, in economic
reality, a lessor is always providing capital to his lessee since the
lessee is freed of the need to use alternative sources of financing to
meet his real property requirements. Thus, the problem becomes one
of defining those leasing situations in which the financing aspect is
so strong as to justify securities protection. "'
While all leases provide capital financing to the lessee, in ordinary
commercial leases the lessee also receives numerous property man-
agement services. These often include maintenance, guard services,
parking, utilities, cleaning and upkeep of hallways, exteriors, eleva-
tors and similar facilities, and payment of taxes. The basic issue in
determining the reach of securities legislation into commercial leas-
ing seems to be what service element is required to make a lease
something other than a financing mechanism. It is here suggested
that the rule should be a strict one, requiring for security status that
139. See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of situations which have
led courts to abandon literalism.
140. See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this policy-oriented
approach and its application to sale-leasebacks.
It should be noted that the Coffey test, discussed at notes 82-92 supra and accompanying
text, is superior to the Howey approach in dealing with this problem. While most of the
elements of his test are present in the naked lease (risk of loss, no control over the enterprise,
and expectation of a valuable benefit), it is not clear that the lessor furnishes any sort of initial
value to the enterprise. Thus the issue is exactly the same as when the problem is approached
through the underlying policy of protecting those who, upon the promise of profit, make their
capital available to others: Is there an investment of capital or a sale of rental services?
141. It should be noted that the issue has been posed in terms of whether the lessee obtains
financing, not in terms of whether the lessor invests in either the rental property or the enter-
prise. This distinction is important. If the securities acts are viewed as protecting all persons
who make investments then one would perforce find securities in such transactions as the sale
or leasing of rental property that is managed by one other than its owner, even if the manager
is entirely unrelated to either the seller or the lessee. That protection of such investors is not
the goal of the securities acts is fairly clear in Howey, where the Court states that legislative
protection is for those investors who supply capital for the use of others. See notes 95-96 supra
and accompanying text. In other words, security status requires not only that an investment
be made, but that the investment provide financing to another person's business. The SEC does
not faithfully observe this distinction. See Investment Diamonds, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,350 (SEC 1971). See note 124 supra.
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the lessor provide no property management services, either personally
or through a manager, save for de minimis duties and such non-
discretionary and purely financial services as payment of taxes and
insurance premiums.' This strict rule is appropriate for two reasons.
First, the test is easy to apply; it basically includes only those leases
under which one lessee takes complete control of the entire prop-
erty.' Further, the formula avoids the difficulties of distinguishing
between varying degrees of lessor involvement and of inquiring into
whether the lessee views the leasehold as a form of financing. Second,
142. The line which is proposed here is different from that which defines a "net" lease, In
the net lease the lessee takes all responsibility for taxes, insurance, utilities and maintenance,
the result being that the rental payments represent the net periodic income on the lessor's
investment. MAISEL 386. Lessor responsibility for these items should not necessarily provide
an escape from security status, at least where the lessor's responsibility is purely financial and
does not involve continuing discretion as to the appearance and operation of the property. For
one thing, purely financial responsibility can be a matter of form rather than substance. Taxes
and insurance are often susceptible to prior estimation and can be added to the rental payments;
while costs of maintenance and utilities may generally be less predictable, reasonably reliable
estimates are probably possible in some situations. However, for the sake of argument it will
be assumed that these quantities are not accurately predictable, and that by accepting responsi-
bility for them the lessor does in fact take a position of greater risk that is reflected in a rental
premium over and above the expected additional costs. In this case the lessor is providing'a
form of rental service, that of bearing the risk of unexpectedly heavy expenses of real property
ownership. However, the essential nature of the transaction is unchanged-it remains one in
which the lessee obtains the use of the lessor's capital upon promise of a return to the lessor
arising from minimally successful operation of the lessee's enterprise. The additional element
of risk assumed by the lessor, in his capacity as insurer, gives the lessor neither increased control
over the enterprise nor reduced dependence on the lessee's ability to produce sufficient income
to meet the rental payments. Further, elimination of the "net" term does not affect the lessor's
reliance on the lessee's representations concerning the stability and profitability of the enter-
prise; indeed, since the lessee is more likely to have the information needed to make projections
of future taxes, repairs, insurance, and utilities, elimination of the "net" term introduces
another uncertainty as to which reliance on the lessee is likely. Thus it seems preferable to retain
security status even where the lessor provides certain rental services, so long as these services
are purely financial and involve no element of discretionary responsibility.
143. It would seem quite unusual for a lessee to take control of less than the entire property
without depending on the lessor for those services, such as heat, physical security, and elevators,
which are used in common with other tenants.
Exactly what constitutes the "property" could be a source of difficulty. Since the proposed
test turns on whether the lessee pays the lessor to shoulder property management responsibili-
ties, "property" should be broad enough to encompass those facilities which are necessary to a
particular enterprise and are ordinarily provided by an owner/occupant. Thus, "property"
would include the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant or suburban shopping center, but probably
would not embrace parking facilities adjacent to a center-city office building. The multi-
building development, such as an office park, could prove particularly troublesome where entire
buildings are rented by single tenants. In the case of suburban office parks it seems appropriate
to include as part of the property the parking and grounds which the owner/occupant of a
suburban building would normally provide for himself.
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the test is mindful that, despite their obvious financing aspect, leases
are not reached by the direct terms of securities legislation. This
legislative omission suggests that judicial interpretation should in-
clude a lease only when it is used precisely as securities are
used-namely, to obtain financing and nothing more.
The foregoing considerations, together with the thought that a
line must be drawn at some point in order to include as a security
the sale-leaseback while excluding the ordinary lease, seem to out-
weigh the arbitrariness that is introduced by excluding some transac-
tions in which the financing element is paramount. The proposed test
excludes situations in which an entrepreneur's thin capitalization
forces him to satisfy his real property needs by lease rather than
purchase if he is willing to forego control of, for example, mainte-
nance. This type of lease clearly is a financing transaction, but be-
cause it is something else in addition, it does not involve a security.
While the line can thus be somewhat arbitrary, it nevertheless seems
more satisfactory than any alternative."'
It should be noted that in proposing a line to separate security and
non-security leasing transactions, no consideration has been given to
the term of the lease. This factor would introduce great uncertainty
and difficulty, not only as to the initial term sufficient for there to
be a security, but also as to the point, if any, in the life of a lease at
which it ceases to be a security. Further, no policy considerations aid
in determining the proper periods, for the term of a financing ar-
rangement normally has no effect on its security status."5 A short-
term lease is best viewed as analogous to other forms of short-term
144. One alternative would be for security status to depend on whether the lessee seeks the
lease with a view to obtaining financing. However, this would introduce questions of intent into
an area of law that has heretofore dealt only with objective considerations; further, it would
yield different treatment for transactions that are identical save for the lessee's intent (a factor
which is neither otherwise relevant to the lessor nor readily known by him).
Another possibility, which would be appropriate if securities legislation were considered to
extend protection to all investors (as opposed to active entrepreneurs, see note 141 supra),
would have security status turn on whether the lessor retains an agent to manage the property.
This test would result in different treatment for transactions that are identical except for the
way in which the lessor meets his management responsibilities, a factor which is beyond the
lessee's control and otherwise is of no importance to him.
145. An exception to this general rule appears in the definition of a security contained in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See note 7 supra. The definition excludes "any note...
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." However, Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S,L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov.
13, 1972), narrowly construed this language to apply only to commercial paper and not to
instruments which were otherwise investment securities. Id. at 1080.
Vol. 1972:1221 ] 1249
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
financing, to be treated as a security if it otherwise meets the relevant
standard.
CONCLUSION
This Note has considered the application of federal securities laws
to sale-leasebacks in particular and, more generally, to real property
leasehold transactions. It has concluded that the pure sale-leaseback
is appropriately treated as a security and that the federal courts are
likely to treat it as such. The Note has also concluded that a percen-
tage rental term is not critical to the sale-leaseback's security status,
and that a security can be created even though the lessor does not
acquire the property from the lessee. Finally, it has been suggested
that a commercial lease is a security, issued by the lessee, if the lessee
obtains complete control of the property and in no significant way
depends on the lessor for property management services.
The reach of the securities laws into the commercial leasing area
is not easily determined, and the Howey test seems especially ill-
suited for defining the line between the sale of rental services and
issuance of a security. The soundest approach is also the most gen-
eral-the Supreme Court's perception that the securities acts are
intended to encompass "the countless and variable schemes devised
by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits." This, of course, is more a statement of policy than a test.
As such, it must be tempered by concern for other policies, such as
the need for legal effects which depend on recognizable, rational
distinctions. It must also be tempered by the understanding that a
statute addressing itself to "securities" is likely not intended to reach
leases, which are readily distinguishable from securities in both lay
and legal terminology, unless the lease is used purely as a financing
mechanism and is devoid of those characteristics which make it also
a sale of property management services.
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